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1.  Introduction 
The principal focus of this research is to quantify opportunity costs in sequential 
transportation auctions. The focus is on a marketplace with time-sensitive truckload 
pickup-and-delivery requests; for the sake of brevity we will refer to this marketplace as the 
“Truck-Load Procurement Market” or TLPM.  In this paper, two carriers compete for 
service requests; each arriving service request triggers an auction where carriers compete 
with each other to win the right of servicing the load. 
 
 The motivation for this work arises from the growth of business-to-business electronic 
commerce and by the increasing use of private exchanges, where a company or group of 
companies invites selected suppliers to interact in a real time marketplace, compete, and 
provide the required services.  High levels of competition characterize this private online 
marketplaces [1].   
 
In the transport/logistics sector, a large number of online marketplaces have emerged to 
cater to the needs of shippers and carries. A current review of freight transportation 
marketplaces business models and market clearing mechanism is presented by Nandiraju 
and Regan [2]. This research focuses on the sequential auction model which is essentially 
dynamic. Carriers participating in a TLPM face complex interrelated decision problems.  
One of them is the dynamic estimation of service costs. As shown in this research, 
opportunity costs are necessary to accurately estimate future consequences of current 
decisions (bids or prices submitted). The carrier that accounts for opportunity costs can 
significantly improve profitability.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents a literature review. Section two 
describes the marketplace framework, operation, and notation.  An expression to evaluate 
opportunity costs is derived and analyzed in section three. Section four presents two 
methods to estimate costs, one static and one dynamic. The main difference between the 
methods is whether they include opportunity costs. Section five describes the evaluation 
settings. Results are analyzed in section six, followed by concluding comments in the final 
section.  
 
2.  Literature Review 
The notion of opportunity costs and the magnitude of opportunity cost for specific 
increments of production or different products have been widely studied in production 
economics theory. As far back as 1965, Mills indicates that uncertainty about future 
demand causes uncertainty concerning opportunity cost for specific increments of 
production or products [3]. Mills further suggests that the expected or ex ante values of 
direct costs and opportunity costs are more difficult to assess than is commonly supposed 
by economists due to interdependence between temporal decisions. Steiner suggests a 
method of analysis to include opportunity costs in the analysis logistics investments 
decisions [4]. This author indicates that opportunity cost is defined as the sacrifice incurred 
in choosing one alternative rather than another. 
 
The concept of opportunity costs has been used in a variety of transportation areas. Zhang 
utilizes opportunity costs to analyze optimal concession of airport operations and facilities 
[5]. Willies et al. reviews the application of social opportunity costs to evaluate highway 
projects [6]. Ratcliff [7] uses the concept of container weight opportunity costs to design a 
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container loading algorithms. Polsby proposes the utilization of opportunity costs in airport 
peak time pricing of arrival and take off slots [8].  
 
The concept of opportunity costs has also been used in auction theory. Smith and Walker 
utilize different levels of opportunity costs in experimental auction bidding to show that 
bidders behave consistently with the with the conventional reward/decision model of 
bidding behavior [9]. Perry and Sakovicks study a sequential auctioning of  two contracts 
[10]. They find that with a fixed number of suppliers the buyer pays a higher expected price 
than with a sole-source auction because the premium paid to the winner of the secondary 
contract must also be paid to the winner of the primary contract as an opportunity cost. 
 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge there is no work in estimation of opportunity costs 
in the context of dynamic vehicle routing problems. The closest line of research is the one 
that deals with sequential auctions for transportation where shipments (contracts) that 
dynamically arrive to a marketplace. Figliozzi, Mahmassani, and Jaillet present a framework 
to study transportation marketplaces and explore the complexities of sequential auction 
bidding [11];  evaluate the competitiveness of different vehicle routing strategies [12] in an 
auction marketplace;  and study the effect of bidding learning mechanisms (reinforcement 
learning and fictitious play) and auction settings (1st or 2nd price auctions) on the 
performance of the transportation marketplace [13]. Figliozzi’s doctoral thesis [14] suggests 
a game theoretic equilibrium formulation of the decision problems faced by the carriers 
(bidders) and recognizing the intractability of that formulation proposes a boundedly 
rational approach to study carriers’ behavior and bidding. 
 
3.  Problem Description 
The TLPM enables the sale of cargo capacity based mainly on price, yet still satisfies 
customer level of service requirements. The specific focus of the study is the reverse 
auction format, where shippers post loads and carriers compete over them (bidding).  The 
auctions operate in real time and transaction volumes and prices reflect the status of 
demand and supply.  
 
The market is comprised of shippers that independently call for shipment procurement 
auctions, and carriers, that participate in the procurement auctions (we assume that the 
probability of two auctions being called at the same time is zero). Auctions are performed 
one at a time as shipments arrive to the auction market. Shippers generate a stream of 
shipments, with corresponding attributes, according to predetermined probability 
distribution functions. Shipment attributes include origin and destination, time windows, 
and reservation price. Reservation price is the maximum amount that the shipper is willing 
to pay for the transportation service. It is assumed that an auction announcement, bidding, 
and resolution take place in real time, thereby precluding the option of bidding on two 
auctions simultaneously.  
 
In the TLPM there are two carriers competing.  A carrier is denoted by i∈ℑ  
where {1,2}ℑ= is the set of all carriers. Let the shipment/auction arrival/announcement 
epochs be 1 2{ , ,..., }Nt t t  such that 1i it t +< . Let 1 2{ , ,..., }NS s s s= , represent the set of 
arriving shipments. Let jt represent the time when shipment  js  arrives and is auctioned. 
Arrival times and shipments characteristics are not known in advance. The arrival instants 
1 2{ , ,..., }Nt t t follow a Poisson arrival process. Furthermore, arrival times and shipments are 
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assumed to come from a probability space ( , , )Ω F P , with outcomes 1 2{ , ,..., }Nω ω ω . Any 
arriving shipment js  represents a realization at time jt  from the aforementioned 
probability space, therefore { , }j j jt sω = . 
 
When a shipment js  arrives, a carrier tenders a price jb R∈ . After each shipment offering, 
the carrier receives feedback jy  regarding the outcome of the offering. The information 
known at the time of the offering for shipment js  is 0 1 2 1( , , ,..., )j jh h y y y −= , where 0h  
denotes the information known by the carriers at time 0t  (with 0 1t t< ) before bidding for 
shipment 1s . Similarly, the information known at time t  with 1j jt t t− ≤ <  
is 0 1 2 1( , , ,..., )t jh h y y y −= . The amount and quality of feedback information received will 
depend on the particulars of the market rules. The level of carrier competition is 
represented by a stationary “price” distribution ξ  (which could be correlated to the 
characteristics of the shipments). The distribution ξ  represents the best price offered by 
the competition and/or the reservation price of the shippers, whichever is least. A central 
assumption is that the distribution of shipment prices are not influenced by the actions (bids 
or fleet management related) taken by the carrier. If the carrier attains the right to serve 
shipment js  then this carrier is paid an amount jξ  ; a value that is determined using a 
second price auction mechanism. 
 
The fleet status when shipment js  arrives is denoted as jz . There is an state or assignment 
function such that the status of the carrier when shipment js  arrives is j j j 1z (t, h , z )a −=  or 
in general ( , , )t t jz a t h z=  for any 1j jt t t +< ≤ .  The distance or cost incurred to serve the 
shipments in the system from time jt  up to time t  using assignment function a  with 
initial status jz  is denoted by d( , , )ja z t . Let jI  be the indicator variable for shipment js , 
such that 1jI =  if the carrier secures the offering for shipment js  and 0jI =  otherwise. 
The static marginal cost of serving a just arrived shipment js  is estimated using ( )jc s  
which is the difference between the costs that the carrier incurs to serve all shipment in 
his/her system plus js  and the costs that the carrier incurs to serve all shipment in his/her 
without js .  
 
3.1 Quantifying Opportunity Costs 
 
The carrier pricing the last shipment Ns  at time Nt  is in a situation strategically similar 
to a one-item second price auction because: a) the carrier’s reward depends on the 
realization of the price distribution for shipment Ns  which is Nξ , b) the reward Nξ  is 
independent of any action taken by the carrier,  and c) the carrier attains the right to serve 
shipment Ns  if N Nb ξ< . 
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In a one-item second price auction, the value of the item (to a particular bidder) is a weakly 
dominant strategy. This value (cost in a reverse auction1) is the bid that maximizes the 
bidder’s expected  profit [15]. Applying this logic but to a reverse auction, the cost of the 
shipment is a weakly dominant strategy.  This cost is the price that maximizes the carrier’s 
expected profit. Therefore, the price for Ns  that maximizes the carrier’s expected profit 
is * ( )N Nb c s= .  
 
The carrier pricing the shipment 1Ns −  is NOT in a situation strategically similar to the 
carrier pricing the shipment Ns  because the submitted price 1Nb −  has an impact on the 
future status of the carrier at time Nt and therefore may affect the profit obtained for 
shipment Ns . Although the carrier’s strategy space is the same at times 1Nt −  and  Nt  the 
carrier’s private information is different at times 1Nt −  and Nt . At time Nt  the carrier knows 
that the bid Nb  will not have an impact on future profits (last arriving shipment); at time 
1Nt −  the carrier knows that the bid 1Nb −  may have an impact on the cost of serving 
shipment Ns , the value of Nb , and future profits. 
 
After submitting 1Nb −  there are just two possible outcomes: 1) the rights for shipment 1Ns −  
are acquired; or 2) the rights are lost. Defining 1( | )N N Ns I −π  as the expected profit from 
shipment Ns  conditional on the previous outcome as:  
 
 
1 ( ) ( ) 1( | 1) [ (c( )| 1)) ]]NN N N N N Ns I E E s I Iω ξ ξ− −π = = [( − =  
* *
1 11 | 1 0 | 1N N N N N NI if b I and I if b Iξ ξ− −= > = = < =  
 
Or 
 
1 ( ) ( ) 1( | 0) [ (c( )| 0)) ]]NN N N N N Ns I E E s I Iω ξ ξ− −π = = [( − =  
* *
1 11 | 0 0 | 0N N N N N NI if b I and I if b Iξ ξ− −= > = = < =  
 
 
If the future expected profits are incorporated into the expression that estimates the 
optimal myopic bid for shipment 1Ns − , the expected profits are: 
 
( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1[ ( ( )) ( | 1) ( | 0) (1 ) ] (1)N NN N N N N N N NE c s I s I I s I Iξ ξ − − − − − −π π− + = + = −  
 
The price * 1Nb −  that maximizes expression (1) is:  
 
                                                          
1 In an auction there is a seller and several buyers; in a reverse auction there is a buyer and several sellers. The 
value that the buyers assign to the item (auction) is replaced by the cost that the sellers assign to the item (reverse 
auction) 
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*
1 ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
argmax [( ( )) ( | 1) ( | 0) (1 )] (2)
1 0R,
N NN N N N N N N N N
N N
b E c s I s I I s I I
b I if b and I if b
ξ ξ
ξ ξ
− − − − − − −
− −
π π∈ − + = + = −
∈ = > = <
 
 
The profit 1( | )N N Ns I −π  conditional on the outcome of the previous auction does not 
depend on the realization of the price function 1Nξ − . Integrating expression (1) over the 
distribution of ξ , the expected value of expression (1) for any price b is:  
 
1 1 1( ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( | 1) ( ) ( ) ( | 0) ( ) ( )N N
b
N N N N N
b b
c s p d s I p d s I p dξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ
∞ ∞
− − −
−∞
π− + = + π =∫ ∫ ∫
 
1 1 1 1( ( ) ( | 1) ( | 0) ) ( ) ( ) ( | 0)N N NN N N N N N N
b
c s s I s I p d s Iξ ξ ξ
∞
− − − −π π π= − + = − = + =∫
 
Since the last term, 1( | 0)N N Ns I −π = , is a constant the bid value that maximizes the 
expected profits maximizes: 
 
1 1 1( ( ) ( | 1) ( | 0) ) ( ) ( )N NN N N N N
b
c s s I s I p dξ ξ ξ
∞
− − −π π− + = − =∫  
 
A bid less than 1 1 1( ) ( | 1) ( | 0)N NN N N N Nc s s I s I− − −π π− = + =  is not optimal since for some 
realizations of 1Nξ −  the revenue obtained for winning the auction does not cover the 
expected costs. A bid greater than 1 1 1( ) ( | 1) ( | 0)N NN N N N Nc s s I s I− − −π π− = + =  is not 
optimal since it reduces the likelihood of winning shipment 1Ns −  for some profitable 
realizations of 1Nξ − . Therefore, a weakly dominated strategy is to bid:  
 
 1 1 1( ) ( | 1) ( | 0) (3)N NN N N N Nc s s I s I− − −π π− = + =  
 
 
3.2  Opportunity costs  
 
The intuition behind (3) is fairly straightforward. The first term represents the “static 
marginal cost” of serving shipment 1Ns −  as if it was the last shipment to arrive. The other 
two terms are linked to the future and are best interpreted together as the opportunity cost 
of winning a shipment. If the difference 1 1( | 0) ( | 1)N NN N N Ns I s I− −π π= − = is:  
 
a) 1 1( | 0) ( | 1) 0N NN N N Ns I s I− −π π= − = >  
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Having to serve 1Ns −  decreases the future profits since the carrier is better off without 
serving 1Ns − . The carrier must hedge against the expected decrease in future profits 
increasing the static marginal cost by the positive difference. This increase may not be only 
due to the increase in the probability of deadheading but also due to the carrier’s operation 
at or near capacity levels. In the latter case (due to capacity restrictions serving the present 
shipment may preclude serving shipment Ns  in the future), the term 
1
1( | )N N Ns z −π in 
expression (3) is zero.  
 
b) 1 1( | 0) ( | 1) 0N NN N N Ns I s I− −π π= − = =  
 
Having to serve 1Ns −  does not change future profits. The carrier must not hedge any value.  
 
c) 1 1( | 0) ( | 1) 0N NN N N Ns I s I− −π π= − = <  
 
Having to serve 1Ns −  increases future profits since the carrier is better off serving 1Ns − . The 
carrier must bid more aggressively for shipment 1Ns −  decreasing the static marginal cost by 
the negative difference. This last case may seem counterintuitive at first glance. However, if 
a vehicle is located in a “sink” area (a lot of trips are attracted and few are generated) 
and 1Ns −  originates in a “sink” and goes to a “source” (a lot of trips are generated and few 
are attracted), it is absolutely plausible that future expected profits with 1Ns −  are greater 
than without 1Ns − .  
 
4.  Cost Estimation Methods 
 
The exact or analytical estimation of equation (3) may be quite involved since it entails 
taking conditional expectations over arrival time and shipment characteristics distributions 
conditional on previous auction outcomes.  Two numerical methods to approximate (3) are 
presented in this section and later evaluated using simulation. These two approaches are: 
Static Fleet Optimal method (SFO) and One- Step-Look-Ahead method (1SLA) 
 
4.1  Static Fleet Optimal (SFO) 
 
This carrier optimizes the static vehicle routing problem at the fleet level. The marginal cost 
is the increment in empty distance that results from adding js  to the total pool of trucks and 
loads yet to be serviced. Communication and coordination capabilities are needed to feed 
the central dispatcher with real time data and to communicate altered schedules to vehicle 
drivers.  
 
If the problem were static, this technology would provide the optimal cost. Like the 
previous approach, it does not take into account the stochastic nature of the problem. This 
technology roughly stands for “the best” a myopic (as ignoring the future but with real time 
information) fleet dispatcher can achieve. A detailed mathematical statement of the mixed 
integer program formulation used by SFO is given in Yang et al. [16].  
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4.2  One- step-look-ahead Opportunity Cost  (1SLA) 
 
As in the previous approach, this carrier optimizes the static vehicle routing problem at the 
fleet level. This provides the static cost for adding js . In addition, this carrier tries to assess 
whether and how much winning js  affects his future profits. The estimated cost in this 
approach is: 
 
1 1( ) ( | 1) ( | 0)N Nj N N N Nc s s I s I− −π π− = + =  
 
Unlike the previous method, the 1SLA carrier takes into account the stochasticity of the 
problem to estimate the opportunity costs of serving js  as if there is just one more arrival 
after js  (one step look ahead). Limiting the “foresight” to just one step into the future has 
two advantages: (a) it considerably eases the estimation and (b) it provides a first 
approximation about the importance of opportunity costs in a given competitive 
environment.  
 
In this paper 1( | )N N Ns I −π  is estimated using simulation. To estimate these two terms it is 
assumed that the carrier knows the true distribution of load arrivals over time and their 
spatial distribution Ω  (it is not discussed in this research how the carrier has acquired this 
information). This type of carrier also has an estimation of the endogenously generated 
prices or payments ξ ; in this paper this type of carrier estimates the price function as a 
normal function, whose mean and standard deviation are obtained from the whole sample 
of previous prices. 
 
5.  Evaluation Setting 
 
The TLPM marketplace enables the sale of truckload cargo capacity based mainly on price, 
yet still satisfies customer level of service demands (in this case hard time windows or TW). 
Shipments and vehicles are fully compatible in all cases; there are no special shipments or 
commodity specific equipment. From the carrier point of view, the ratio between shipment 
time window lengths and service time duration (or trip length) affects how many shipments 
can be accommodated in a vehicle’s route; in general, the more shipments that can be 
accommodated, the lesser the deadheading (or average empty distance). Three different 
TW length/shipment service duration ratios are simulated. These ratios are denoted short, 
medium, and long; a reference to the average time window length. The different Time 
Window Lengths (TWL) for a shipment s , where ( )ld s  denotes the function that returns 
the distance between a shipment origin and destination, are: 
 
• TWL( ) 1( ( ) 0.25) uniform[0.0,1.0] ( )s ld s short= + +  
• TWL( ) 2( ( ) 0.25) uniform[0.0,2.0] ( )s ld s medium= + +  
• TWL( ) 3( ( ) 0.25) uniform[0.0,3.0] ( )s ld s long= + +  
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The shipments to be auctioned are circumscribed in a bounded geographical region. The 
simulated region is a 1 by 1 square area. Trucks travel from shipments origins to 
destinations at a constant unit speed (1 unit distance per unit time).  
Information concerning the origin and destination of the shipments is not known to the 
carriers in advance. Shipments origins and destinations are uniformly distributed over the 
region. There is no explicit underlying network structure in the chosen origin-destination 
demand pattern. Alternatively, it can be seen as a network with infinite number of origins 
and destinations (essentially each point in the set [0,1]x[0,1]) has an infinite number of 
corresponding links. Each and every link possesses an equal infinitesimal probability of 
occurrence.). This geographical demand pattern creates a significant amount of uncertainty 
for fleet management decisions such as costing a shipment or vehicle routing. Since the 
degree of deadheading is unknown, any fleet management decision should hedge for this 
uncertainty. Shipment service times are taken into account in order to simulate 
dynamic truckload pickup-and-delivery situations (dynamic multi-vehicle routing problems 
with time-windows). It is assumed that no significant time is spent during all pick-ups and 
deliveries; however vehicles are assumed to travel at a constant speed in a Euclidean two 
dimensional space. Vehicles speeds are a unit; the average shipment length is ≅0.52. 
Carriers’ sole sources of revenue are the payments received when a shipment is acquired. 
Carriers’ costs are proportional to the total distance traveled by the fleet. It is assumed that 
all carriers have the same cost per mile. The market is comprised of shippers that 
independently call for shipment procurement auctions, and carriers, that participate in them 
(we assume that the likelihood of two auctions being called at the same time is zero). 
Auctions are performed one at a time as shipments arrive to the auction market. In this 
research different demand/supply ratios are studied. Arrival rates range from low to high. 
At a low arrival rate, all the shipments can be served (if some shipments are not serviced it 
is due to a very short time window). At a high arrival rate carriers operate at capacity and 
many shipments have to be rejected.  It is assumed that the auction announcements are 
random and that their arrival process follows a time Poisson process. The expected inter-
arrival time is normalized with respect to the market fleet size. The expected inter-arrival 
times are 1/ 2   arrivals per unit time per truck, 2 / 2  arrivals per unit time per truck, 
and 3/ 2  arrivals per unit time per truck (low, medium, and high arrival rates respectively).  
 
In all cases it is assumed that a carrier bids only if a feasible solution has been found. If 
serving js  unavoidably violates the time window of a previously won shipment, the carrier 
simply abstains from bidding or submits a high bid that exceeds the reservation price of js .  
 
Allocations follow the rules of a second price reverse auction. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that carriers submit their best estimation of the service cost. The allocations 
rules are as follows: 
 
• Each carrier submits a single price; 
• The winner is the carrier with the lowest bid (which must be below the reservation 
price set as 1.41 units; otherwise the auction is declared void); 
• The item (shipment) is awarded to the winner; 
• The winner is paid either the value of the second lowest bid or the reservation price, 
whichever is the lowest; and 
• The other carriers (not winners) do not win, pay, or receive anything 
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In this research a discrete-event simulation framework is employed. Simulations are used to 
compare how different opportunity cost approximations perform under different market 
settings (in our case limited to arrival rates and time windows). All the figures and data 
presented are obtained with a carriers’ fleet size of two and four vehicles. The results 
obtained reflect the steady state operation (1000 arrivals and 10 iterations) of the simulated 
system. This is obtained using an adequate warm-up period, in all cases set to one hundred 
arrivals (a warm up length more than adequate for the fleet sizes and shipment time 
windows considered).  
 
6.  Analysis of Results 
 
Figures 1 to 3 compare the profit performance of the approach SFO vs. approach 1SLA 
with different arrival rates: low, medium, and high respectively. All these 3 figures also 
include 90% significant intervals around the means. A general trend illustrated in each of 
these figures is that profit levels tend to decrease as time windows grow. As the routing 
problems become less constrained, there are more possibilities for competition and prices 
and profits follow a downward trend.  
 
When comparing 1SLA and SFO (the latter use as a base), the more sophisticated method 
does not outperform the less sophisticated method across the board with medium and long 
time windows. Profit-wise, the 1SLA carrier obtains higher or equal profits than the SFO, 
yet no clear pattern emerges from figures 1 to 3. Figure 4 compares the performance of the 
1SLA vs. SFO methods in terms of the number of shipments served. The results obtained 
for the less sophisticated carrier (SFO carrier figure 4) are used as the base line. Any 
positive difference is indicated in red; any negative difference is indicated in blue. 
Regarding shipments served, the 1SLA carrier tends to serve fewer shipments when the 
time windows are short. However, 1SLA carrier tends to serve more shipments for 
medium and long time windows. Arrival rates affect these differences.  
 
The key to understanding the relative performance of technologies 1SLA and SFO is in the 
average payment received by each carrier. Figure 5 compares average payment for 
approach SFO vs. approach 1SLA with high arrival rates and including 90% significant 
intervals around the means. Clearly, carrier 1SLA manages to obtain higher profits with 
fewer shipments served (high arrival rate, short time windows, figure 3 and 4) because 
average payments are significantly higher (figure 5). The difference in pricing shipments is 
derived from the term: 1 1( | 0) ( | 1)N NN N N Ns I s I− −π π= − = . As previously mentioned, this 
term measures the opportunity cost of winning the current auction.  Results indicate that 
the 1SLA carrier tends to set bid values more aggressively (bids lower) when the time 
windows are not short and the arrival rate is not too high. The 1SLA carrier tends to bid 
less aggressively (bids higher) when the time windows are short and the arrival rate is high. 
There are two distinct forces operating in the market: time windows and arrival rates. An 
increase in arrival rates increases the bid values (therefore the opportunity cost has 
increased). A decrease in time window lengths increases the bid values (therefore the 
opportunity cost has increased). In only one setting SFO outperforms 1SLA, however this 
result is not statistically significant (figure 2).  
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7.  Conclusions 
The principal focus of this research was to quantify opportunity costs in sequential 
transportation auctions. An expression to evaluate opportunity costs was derived.  This 
paper shows that the impact of evaluating opportunity costs is dependent on the 
competitive market setting. A simplified approach (1SLA) to estimate opportunity costs 
was developed and applied successfully. It was shown that the estimation of opportunity 
costs in an online marketplace provides a competitive edge. However, the exact calculation 
of opportunity costs can be quite challenging.  
 
In summary, this research was successful to (1) recognize that different market settings 
(arrival rates, time windows) affect the value of estimating opportunity costs; (2) to develop 
an expression to estimate opportunity costs; and (3) to enhance our understanding of the 
interaction between routing and pricing problems in a competitive marketplace.  
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Figure 1:   Profits and Significant Intervals (1SLA vs. SFO Technology) – Low Arrival Rates 
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Figure 2:   Profits and Significant Intervals (1SLA vs. SFO Technology) – Medium Arrival Rates 
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Figure 3:   Profits and Significant Intervals (1SLA vs. SFO Technology) – High Arrival Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:   Shipments Served Difference 1SLA vs. SFO Technology 
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Figure 5:   Average Payment Value and Significant Difference (1SLA vs. SFO) – High Arrival Rate 
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